One of the great unresolved problems which the Second Interna tional bequeathed to its post-1914 successors was the question of colonial policy.
The SDAP press and propaganda network was also rather limited. The SDAP maintained one national daily.
Though this newspaper, Het Volk,
began to publish in 1900, only in 1910 did it reach 10,000 subscrip tions.5 Beneath Het Volk, lay a series of regional party papers.
The limitations of size were compounded by two additional factors; suffrage restrictions and the absence of a national, social-democratic union movement.
The suffrage law stipulated that in order to vote an adult male had to meet a series of (gradually relaxed) property quali fications measured by income, taxation, savings, and rent.
In 1870, only 12.1 percent of the adult males had the right to vote.
By 1900, the figure had risen to 49 percent, but even in 1914 it stood no higher than 67.6 percent.6 These suffrage restrictions insured a very modest SDAP faction in the 100-seat Tweede Kamer--the lower house of the parliament.
In 1897, the SDAP elected two deputies, in 1901 six, plus a seventh who joined the faction after a 1902 by-election, and in 1905 the faction fell from seven to six deputies.7 The lack of a national union arm also hindered the development of the SDAP.
The Nationaal Arbeids-Secretariaat, formed in 1893, was anti-parliamentary, revolu tionary, and syndicalist; it would have nothing to do with the SDAP. Moreover, development of unions of any kind was hampered by the pecu liar nature of the Dutch economy.
In 1899, 29.6 percent of the labor force was employed in the agrarian sector of the economy.
Industry and manufacture accounted for only 33.8 percent.8 Dutch agriculture was characterized by labor-intensive exploitation of small plots.
In like manner, Dutch industry and manufacturing was typically composed of small units with a strong accent on craft-trades. The Netherlands lacked a large blue-collar concentration similar to those found in Belgium, northern France, and the German Rhineland.
The most highly developed sector of the labor force was in trans portation.
Yet even here, the SDAP encountered difficulties. In Amsterdam, the harbor workers were either syndicalist and thus anti socialist, or unorganized and hostile toward the SDAP.
The Rotterdam harbor workers were generally unorganized, and during the late-nineteenth century the SDAP remained relatively weak in Rotterdam. The SDAP built its initial electoral foundations in the northern, Calvinist areas.
The 1878-95 agrarian depression in Friesland had fanned social discontent and had played a major role in the generation of a Bond following both in Friesland and in the neighboring provinces. Beyond this, the Friesche Volkspartij, a popular, democratic reform party, began to emerge in the last years of the crisis.
Troelstra, who was active in both movements at the provincial and regional level, carried members of the Volkspartij and the parliamentary wing of the Bond into the SDAP in the years following its formation.
As parliamen tary fraction leader, he conceived of the SDAP as a popular reform party, committed to democratic ideals and parliamentary government as well as to socialism.
While Troelstra considered himself a socialist and a marxist, he did not envision the SDAP as being purely a bluecollar workers' party.
In Troelstra's mind, the SDAP had to draw diverse social groupings into a flexible socialist framework.
The goal was the realization of a socialist state through an SDAP majority in parliament.
Once universal suffrage was obtained, Troelstra was confident that a social democratic majority would follow--if the party maintained a broad construction.
As leader of the parliamentary frac tion, Troelstra wielded enormous influence within the party.
He also served as editor of Het Volk until the autumn of 1903.
Troelstra's devotion to the parliamentary route was paralleled by a fondness for revolutionary rhetoric.
This fusion of devotion to the parliamentary path to socialism and a real, if sentimental, commitment to revolution allowed Troelstra to assume a middle position between a reformist bloc headed by the parliamentarian J. H. Schaper and the journalist Willem Vliegen and two marxist factions.
In practice, however, Troelstra was increasingly forced to side with the reformist bloc, which, while satisfied with his political leadership, was often unnerved by his revolutionary rhetoric and personal instability.10
The years 1901-9 were particularly difficult for the Troelstra grouping within the SDAP. He pointed to the labor theory of value, the mystique of revolution, and the growing impover ishment of the labor force, as all being in one way or another incor rect.
The needs for a moral basis for socialism and for attention to national particulars and peculiarities were also accented.
The essay triggered a polemical reply by Frank van der Goes, who was always ready to defend Marx, in the same journal.21 Although no more than an incident, the exchange was an early indication of Van Kol's reformism. Noting the consensus on both the colonial and mili tary resolutions, she concluded that ' 'there is not, and cannot be, an imperialist minority in social democracy.' 123 She then proceeded to endorse the three policy recommendations with a slight stress upon the first.
' ' The congress could not have placed more emphasis on the great importance of colonial policy in this era of social development than by recommending--study.
Because we know that we are powerless against a phenomena until we grasp and understand it. Taken in total, the draft embodied a series of reform demands which some Dutch liberals could have accepted. Class struggle, internal contradictions, the formation of an Indonesian social democratic party--none of these appeared in the draft.
Nor did Van Kol develop points 2 or 3 of the 1900 Paris resolution on colonial policy--a resolution which he himself presented to the congress on behalf of the colonial commission.
The draft text opened with this statement of principle:
' ' The welfare of the natives, their physical, intellectual and moral development must be the ultimate goal of our colonial policy.
Our primary task is the advancement of economic de velopment with as much alleviation as possible of the unavoidable tran sition period.
The selfish administration and the capitalist exploita tion of our colonies must make room for a political economy of moral responsibility." 26
The creation of a socialist society was not men tioned.
The final point was equally significant. Bearing on adminis tration, and entitled "0ur Duty," it defined the goal of SDAP colonial policy as being "to develop the native through wise and unselfish guardianship to self-government. The Van Kol draft appeared just a few days before the annual party congress.
Although it was placed on the congress agenda, the congress declined to take any action.
Neither the leading organs of the SDAP nor the Partij Bestuur were planning to press colonial policy as an issue in an election year.
Beyond this, the SDAP was in the midst of a debate over the party's agrarian program.
Herman Gorter had charged that the 1897 agrarian program was not marxist and did not represent a socialist solution.
Troelstra, acting as a parliamentarian and editorin-chief of Bet Volk, assumed the responsibility of defending the party program. This debate dominated the congress, hence the colonial ques tion was pushed into the background.
The sections Kampen and Breda introduced motions calling for further study, and the congress adopted the Breda motion, which was introduced by Van Kol (speaking as a dele gate from the section Breda), quickly and with no debate.
The colonial question was thus dispatched in a matter of minutes.
The motion con cluded: the congress of the SDAP "decides to name a commission, which will conduct further study of the components of the draft-program, and which will issue a report thereon at the next congress, and goes over to the order of the day."30 Henri Polak, leader of the diamond work ers' union in addition to being chairman of the SDAP, suggested that "the proposal be changed so that the new program be considered not at 
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the formulation of colonial policy until this date. But once named, the commission was inactive for two years.
Only in January 1904 did it suddenly begin to move toward the rapid development of a resolution on colonial policy--for presentation to the 1904 Amsterdam congress of the Second International, however, not to the SDAP.
Assisted by the party commission in the drafting process, Van Kol was to present the resolution to the Amsterdam congress.
After considerable debate with Pieter Wiedijk, who had drafted both a critique and an alternative statement, Van Kol finally submitted a fifth, and final draft to the commission. This draft was adopted by the commission and was carried by Van Kol into the colonial committee of the Second International during the Amsterdam congress in August, 1904.
The draft repeated a number of familiar points; retention of colonies by a socialist regime, reform and welfare policies, the necessity and advantages of colonies as raw material supply sources, and the establishment of state enterprises. The direct interests of European labor were not slighted:
It is the duty of social democracy, where a modern proletariat arises in the colonies, to make it more defensible in its fight against capi tal through the promotion of its organization and the protection of its health; and through an increase in its standard of living to avert the danger of competition which the cheap labor of underdevel oped peoples can present to the workers of the more developed capi talist lands.* 33
The draft also called for the eventual realization of self-government within the various colonial zones.
In the process of developing the draft, the first attempt by a Dutch marxist to establish a marxist framework for a colonial policy has failed.
Wiedijk1s drafts were never published nor were they widely circulated.
Van Kol read all three of them, as in all probability did Troelstra; the balance of the committee read only drafts two and three. In her mind, the adoption of the Van Kol resolution would merely imply that the European socialdemocratic parties "should not use their political power to prevent the economic development of the colonies in a capitalist direction because they know capitalism is an inevitable phase in the life of a people." 47 Pieter Wiedijk, despite his activity on the SDAP colonial commission, was silent on this particular issue.
It is interesting to note that

Once again Van Kol formulated a new colonial resolution, this time without the help of a commission, and submitted it to the colo nial commission of the 1907 Stuttgart congress of the Second Interna tional.
Since this commission contained a revisionist majority led by Eduard David and Van Kol, a resolution was presented to the congress endorsing the principle of colonies and linking social and technologi cal progress to the colonial experience.
The resolution approved the retention of colonies by socialist regimes and justified this in terms of a civilizing mission.
The latter point represented a complete 45. Ibid., pp. 8-9, embodies the minutes of the August 14 delegation caucus. The two resolutions were placed before the congress and a heated debate followed.
Herman Gorter, nHet internationaal congres," Nieuwe
Van Kol played a major role in leading the floor fight for the majority report which was eventually defeated 108-127 with ten abstentions.
It is perhaps of some significance that the Dutch delegation did not vote.1 *9 Given Karl Kautskyfs support of the minority resolution, it is safe to assume that Van Van Kol urged the sale of the outer Indonesian islands to a foreign power(s). He had already advanced a sale scheme in parliament, without consulting the SDAP or receiving a mandate to do so from a party congress.
On the other hand, Troelstra did not disassociate the SDAP from the proposal--a step he could have taken in his capacity as the parliamentary frac tion's leader.
The sale plan was designed to further the implementa tion of a welfare policy to be applied to Java, Sumatra and a core of inner islands.
It would provide for the retention of islands of eco nomic importance to the Dutch economy and would cut the cost of colo nial administration.
The relative imbalance in size and population between the island complex and the Netherlands would thus be partially corrected and the fiscal demands of an ethical policy reduced.
Wiedijk advanced a critique of the Van Kol draft in the form of annotations which were then communicated to the balance of the commit tee.
Troelstra replied that he had read Wiedijk's communication "with great interest" and suggested that Wiedijk work up a resolution of his own to counter, or balance, the Van Kol formulation.68 The sale ques tion was choked to death by Troelstra who agreed with Wiedijk's judg ment that it should be dropped from the draft altogether.
The latter point was made clear in a letter from Troelstra to Wiedijk. "The sale question does not belong at the congress, but rather at a meeting of the interparliamentary commission, which is linked to the International bureau.
At the congress we deal with general tactics and resolutions of principle.' *69
The Wiedijk draft attempted to advance marxist, social-democratic guidelines for a colonial policy program.
One must bear in mind that Wiedijk had to formulate the draft rather quickly and does not seem to 64. Ibid Wiedijk argued that the problem in colonial zones, particularly in Indonesia, lay in the mode of production.
Land and resources were exploited by a feudal mode; the produce was transferred by commercial capitalist institu tions.
This combination precluded the generation of a class-conscious industrial proletariat.
The first step in formulating a socialist colonial policy had to entail the assumption that until industrial capitalist enterprise pene trated the colonial zone socialist possibilities would be limited. Until that time, however, the same principles of class struggle, opera tive in industrial Europe, were to be applied in the colonial zone. The dimension of application would be limited and the expectations modest.
There are several points to note in the Wiedijk draft.
First, he continually used the term "feudal mode of production" with neither reference nor mention of Marx's concept of an Asian productive mode. Second, the implied determinism of the Wiedijk model is quite striking. The colonial zone must generate an industrial base as a prerequisite to the social-democratic struggle.
Third, Wiedijk did not grapple with the theoretical possibility of a social-democratic party seizing power in a European nation whose colonial zone was still feudal in its productive mode.
Presumably it too would become socialist, but Wiedijk offered neither guidelines nor program.
Fourth, at no point did Wiedijk expressly advance a demand for immediate independence of colo nial territories.
According to Wiedijk, the counter-draft was seen only by Van Kol and Troelstra.70
The former, sensing that the balance of the committee was opposed to his sale plan, withdrew his draft.
After the subsequent meeting, Wiedijk developed a third draft.
Entitled "General Aspects," this draft also contained a resolution.
The new formulation embodied the same thesis as the Wiedijk critique, i.e., it stressed the impor tance of industrial capitalist advance in the colonial zone. Wiedijk argued that colonies followed from the nature of the capitalist system.
The capacity of productive capital exceeded the capacity of internal domestic markets to absorb its produce, thus causing an inevitable drive into pre-capitalist areas.
(It should be noted here that Wiedijk used the term "capitalist" in this particular tract to designate an industrial or semi-industrial polity.
He was not writing about pre-industrial mercantile societies.)
The concentra tion of industrial capital in an ever-diminishing number of hands and the emergence of monopolistic structures created a situation in which private interests, wielding enormous economic power, controlled the bourgeois state.
The state apparatus was then mobilized to advance private domestic interests.
In this way, Wiedijk drew the connective links between monopoly capitalism, colonialism, militarism and patri otic chauvinism.76
Armed with this conceptual framework, Wiedijk then sought to ex plain the clash at Stuttgart.
The revisionist bloc failed to recog nize that colonial structures were an inherent part of the capitalist system.77 Hence reform demands would never be fully realized until the system itself was destroyed.
The marxist bloc, on the other hand, while justified in its rejection of colonial enterprise as a matter of principle, failed to grasp the importance of reform demands.
In the colonies, as in Europe, social democracy was at once a reform movement and a revolutionary marxist movement.
The proper social-democratic colonial policy, Wiedijk argued, accepted colonialism as an inevitable manifestation of the industrial capitalist order.
This necessary evil need not be endorsed.
One should present the colonial structures with reform demands while working to destroy the system which generated them.
MSocial democracy thus rejects in principle the colonial policy of capitalism; through reform proposals social democracy attempts to improve the lot of those colonized.
It The theoreti cal discussion of imperialism in the German SPD thus never had their equivalent in the Netherlands.83
The nature of Dutch social-democratic colonial policy and the marxist response to it was inevitably linked to the fabric of the SDAP itself.
Given the restricted suffrage and the absence of a national union framework, the SDAP had to generate petit bourgeois electoral support if it were to realize its parliamentary goals.
The primacy of parliamentary goals, the final objective quite naturally being a social-democratic majority within the nation, was implicit in the very origins of the party in 1894.
The operating assumption that the SDAP would be, above all, a parliamentary socialist party, was further strengthened by the injection into the SDAP of reforming petit bour geois radicals who followed Troelstra out of the Friesche Volkspartij and into the social-democratic movement.
The quantitative weakness of the movement also played a major role.
Once committed to a parliamen tary bent the party had to mobilize voters from sectors other than the classic blue-collar groupings, which, given the relatively modest in dustrial sector, were small in comparison to their Imperial German or Belgian counterparts.
The social base, the suffrage laws, and, until 1905, the lack of a union arm were further compounded by the hold of the Roman Catholic State Party over Catholic labor and the deep inroads 
